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CHAPTER 7: DRUG COURTS – LESSONS FROM THE UK AND BEYOND 
 
Gill McIvor 
 
 
THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF DRUG COURTS  
 
Drug courts were established initially in the United States in the late 1980s, initiated 
by sentencers who were frustrated at the limited range and effectiveness of existing 
criminal justice measures for dealing with drug-related crime. The first drug court was 
introduced in Dade County, Florida in 1989. The impetus for the establishment of 
drug courts in North America came from a growing acknowledgement of the link 
between drug misuse and crime along with increasing evidence of the efficacy of drug 
treatment, including treatment that is compelled rather than undertaken on a voluntary 
basis (for example, Farabee et al., 1998; Hough, 1996; Gebelein, 2000; and, more 
recently, McSweeney et al, 2007). Operationally, drug courts vary across 
jurisdictions, but all are designed to reduce drug use and drug-related offending by 
combining drug treatment with ongoing supervision and court-based review. Drug 
courts – and other ‘problem-solving’ courts – represent an approach to criminal 
justice processing that has been termed ‘therapeutic jurisprudence’ (Wexler and 
Winick, 1992)1 which refers to capacity of legal processes and procedures (including 
the actions and approaches of criminal justice professionals) to have therapeutic or 
anti-therapeutic outcomes. Under traditional court models, rehabilitation may be an 
aim of criminal justice processing but within a model of therapeutic jurisprudence it is 
intrinsic to the process. 
This chapter examines the introduction and expansion of drug courts and the key 
features of their structure and operation, locating the more recent development of drug 
courts in the United Kingdom in an international context. Drawing upon process and 
outcome evaluations, the operation of drug courts in England and Wales and in 
Scotland is compared and contrasted and emerging findings related to the wider 
international literature, with a particular emphasis upon operational barriers and 
concerns (including the development of multi-professional teamwork and the capacity 
of drug courts to accommodate diversity). The chapter also examines the evidence 
regarding the capacity of drug courts to impact upon drug use and drug-related crime 
and identifies the features of drug courts that appear to be important in this respect. 
 
Although there are wide differences in the manner in which they operate, drug courts 
are characterised by a number of key features including: the use of a non-adversarial 
approach; the ‘fast-tracking’ of participants into treatment; the provision of a 
continuum of treatment, rehabilitation and related services; frequent testing for illicit 
drugs (and usually, in the USA, alcohol); effective teamwork between judge, 
prosecution, defence and treatment providers to secure compliance; the application of 
rewards and sanctions (‘smart punishment’) to provide external motivation; ongoing 
judicial review of progress in individual cases; and partnerships with public agencies 
and community-based organisations (Gebelein, 2000; Freiberg, 2002a). Longshore et 
al (2001) have developed a conceptual framework for the classification of drug courts, 
which they suggest may vary in terms of: leverage (where they are located in the 
criminal justice process and the available system of sanctions and rewards); 
population severity (the nature of the targeted population in terms of drug use and 
offending history); programme intensity: the frequency of testing, supervision 
 2 
meetings and review and types of treatment available (for example, residential versus 
non-residential); predictability (the consistency and certainty of judicially imposed 
rewards and sanctions and their compliance with the drug court protocol); and 
rehabilitative emphasis (the degree of collaborative decision-making, attention to 
offenders’ needs and flexibility with respect to procedures). 
 
From modest beginnings the drug court ‘movement’ (Nolan, 2001) in the United 
States had grown exponentially. By 1999 there were 472 drug court programmes in 
operation in the USA and by 2007 this had increased to 2,147 (Huddleston et al., 
2008). The impetus to the expansion of drug courts in the mid-1990s came from the 
provision of federal funding through the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement 
Act 1994. Federal funding was intended to have a pump-priming function after which 
drug courts were required to compete for local and state funding for their continued 
survival. Between 1989 and 1997, drug courts were provided with around $80 million 
of federal funding and $45 million funding from state and local governmental and 
non-governmental sources (Wilson et al., 2006). Increasingly drug courts are 
becoming integrated as part of the mainstream judicial function (Goldkamp, 2003). 
 
The numerical increase in drug treatment courts is also matched by their growing 
specialisation and diversity. A national survey conducted in 2007 revealed that 
‘traditional’ adult drug treatment courts remained most common, comprising 1174 of 
the 2,147 drug courts in operation. However the United States also had 435 juvenile 
drug courts (dealing with delinquency and status offending linked to drug or alcohol 
use)1; 301 family drug courts (focusing upon parental substance misuse); 110 
designated Driving While Impaired (DWI) courts; 72 tribal drug courts; 24 re-entry 
courts (facilitating release from local or state correctional facilities); six campus 
courts (targeting students involved in excessive substance misuse); and five federal 
district courts (based on early discharge from prison under intensive drug treatment 
and supervision) (Huddleston et al., 2008). There has also been a trend towards drug 
courts dealing with more serious offences and offenders. The early drug courts tended 
to focus on pre-plea diversion from prosecution of offenders charged with minor drug 
offences (such as possession of cannabis) but there is now a greater emphasis upon 
post-plea procedures, with 78 per cent of drug courts estimated to operate in this way 
(Huddleston et al., 2008).  
 
Internationally, drug courts have been introduced in a number of jurisdictions 
including Canada, Australia, Ireland, Brazil, Jamaica and Bermuda. The first drug 
Canadian drug court was introduced in Toronto in 1998 followed by a second court in 
Vancouver in 2001 (Fischer, 2003). More recently, drug treatment courts have been 
established in Edmonton, Regina, Winnipeg and Ottawa (Werb et al., 2007). The first 
Australian drug court was set up in New South Wales in 1998 and by 2003, drug 
courts were also operational in Western Australia, South Australia, Victoria and 
Queensland (Indermaur and Roberts, 2003). A further drug court pilot was introduced 
in Tasmania in 2007. 
 
 
The introduction of drug courts in the UK 
 
The United Kingdom, in common with other western jurisdictions, has sought to 
develop more effective ways of responding to drug-related crime. Although the link 
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between drug use and crime is complex, it is recognised that much acquisitive crime 
occurs through the need for individuals with drug problems to obtain the financial 
resources necessary to maintain a regular supply of drugs. In the 1990s policy 
attention shifted towards demand reduction through the provision of drug treatment to 
individuals whose offending was related to the misuse of drugs. The criminal justice 
system was perceived as a suitable route into treatment for individuals with drug 
problems in view of emerging research findings that indicated that mandated 
treatment could be as effective as treatment accessed voluntarily (Hough, 1996). As a 
result, as Stevens (2007: 90) has argued, ‘the emphasis in drug policy has been 
strongly in favour of an increased role for the criminal justice system’ as indicated in 
the White Paper ‘Tackling Drugs Together’ (HM Government, 1995), the subsequent 
10-year drug strategy (HM Government, 1998) and the latest drug strategy (HM 
Government, 2008a). 
 
The introduction of drug courts in the UK has followed a slightly different trajectory 
to other jurisdictions, where drug courts filled an important gap in the range of 
community-based sanctions available to the courts to deal with drug-related crime. In 
the UK some of the key features of drug courts (such as regular testing and judicial 
review) were incorporated into Drug Treatment and Testing Orders (DTTOs), 
introduced through the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (see Stevens, this volume). 
 
Pilot DTTO schemes were introduced in England in 1998 in three pilot sites, with 
varying degrees of success (Turnbull et al., 2000) and in two pilot sites in Scotland in 
1999/2000 (Eley, Gallop et al, 2002) prior to wider national roll-out.2 Although 
DTTOs represented an innovative criminal justice response to drug-related offending, 
they attracted some criticism. Bean (2002), in particular, described them as ‘watered 
down’ versions of drug courts because they contained some of their elements but not 
the co-ordinated multi-professional team approach that characterised drug courts in 
other jurisdictions. 
 
Shortly after the introduction of DTTOs in Scotland, and following a review of 
international developments in drug courts (Walker, 2001), the Scottish Government 
agreed to fund pilot drug courts in the same location as the earlier DTTO pilots 
(Glasgow and Fife). The Glasgow drug court became operational in November 2001 
and the Fife drug court made its first orders in September 2002. Initial funding of the 
pilot drug courts was extended following a broadly positive evaluation (McIvor et al, 
2006) though there appear to be no immediate plans by the government to introduce 
further drug court pilots in Scotland, with the most recent strategy document from the 
Scottish Government indicating that the success and effectiveness of the pilot Drug 
Courts would be reviewed in 2009 (Scottish Government, 2008). 
 
Pilot drug courts (referred to as Dedicated Drug Courts (DDCs) were introduced in 
England and Wales in 2005. West London and Leeds magistrates’ courts were 
selected by the Home Office as the pilot sites, though a drug court model had already 
been operational in Leeds for a number of years.  A process evaluation of the pilots in 
London and Leeds provides some early data on the implementation and operation of 
the pilot drug courts (Matrix Knowledge Group, 2008) but very limited information 
about treatment, testing and outcomes. Nonetheless, the Secretary of State for Justice 
announced on 1 April 2008 that further drug court pilots would be introduced in four 
more sites, the location of which would be decided following consultation with the 
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judiciary, court staff and other key parties. The expansion of drug courts (subject to 
evaluation of the pilots) was identified as a key action in the most recent government 
strategy on drugs (HM Government, 2008a) aimed, along with a number of other 
proposals at ‘proactively targeting and managing drug misusing offenders’ (HM 
Government, 2008b). 
 
 
THE CHARACTERISTICS AND OPERATION OF THE UK DRUG COURTS  
 
The Scottish drug court pilots 
 
The Scottish drug court pilots shared many features with similar courts in other 
jurisdictions. It was agreed from the outset, however, that they would target repeat 
offenders whose offending was assessed as being directly related to their misuse of 
drugs and who were at immediate risk of receiving a custodial sentence. They were, 
therefore, located within the Sheriff Summary Courts - the middle level court in 
Scotland with sentencing powers of up to six months imprisonment for individual 
offences.  
 
The sentencing options available to the drug courts were the same as those available 
to any Sheriff Court operating under summary proceedings. In practice, however, the 
majority of orders made in the first two years were DTTOs (78 per cent of cases in 
both Glasgow and Fife) (McIvor et al., 2006). Probation orders were likely to be 
imposed where offenders were identified as having additional problems that required 
additional intervention and support or where the Sheriff wanted to review offenders’ 
progress more than once a month. Deferred sentences were often used in respect of 
additional or further offences to provide sheriffs with a means of rewarding good 
progress or sanctioning offenders who were not responding well.  
 
Assessments of offenders’ suitability for the drug courts were undertaken by a 
supervision and treatment team and offenders were bailed for one month for this 
purpose. If a drug court order was recommended by the team and the court agreed 
with the recommendation, a DTTO and/or probation order would be imposed for 
between six months and three years, during which time offenders would be linked into 
a treatment service (usually methadone), seen regularly by their supervising social 
worker and addiction worker, subjected to regular drug testing (typically three times 
per week in the early stages of the order) and brought back to court regularly (at least 
once a month) to have their progress reviewed by the drug court Sheriff. Subject to 
progress, offenders could have specific requirements of their orders amended such as 
the frequency of testing and reviews increased or decreased. 
 
A central tenet of the drug courts was the recognition that drug misuse is a relapsing 
condition and for this reason concerted efforts were made to retain offenders on their 
orders. In the event of non-compliance the court could impose sanctions such as 
varying the frequency of reporting and/or testing. If good progress was made on an 
order (as indicated by negative drug tests and co-operation with other requirements) it 
would run to the termination date or could be discharged early if a stage was reached 
where no further progress was deemed to be required. When the drug courts were 
initially introduced, there were no legislated sanctions available to deal with serious 
or persistent non-compliance, other than to terminate the order and impose an 
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alternative (usually custodial) sentence. Since July 2003, however, the drug courts 
have had the power to impose short prison sentences (of up to 31 days cumulatively) 
or short periods of community service while allowing a drug court order to continue. 
Although the Scottish drug court Sheriffs were not operating explicitly within a model 
of therapeutic jurisprudence (Wexler and Winick, 1992), it is clear that a central 
concern was in creating the conditions through which the drug court process could 
encourage and support participants in their efforts to become drug free. The vehicle 
for ongoing contact between sentencers and participants was the regular court-based 
review. Although reviews are also a feature of non-drug court DTTOs, in the drug 
court they were preceded by multi-professional pre-review meetings aimed at 
furnishing the sheriff with an improved quality and range of information to facilitate 
decision-making.  
 
While both drug courts operated in broadly similar ways, there were important 
organisational and operational differences across the two pilot sites (McIvor et al., 
2006). In Glasgow, the drug court team comprised two Sheriffs who sat in the court 
on alternative weeks, a dedicated Procurator Fiscal (prosecutor), a dedicated clerk and 
court officer and the drug court Supervision and Treatment team. The latter consisted 
of a team leader, supervising social workers, addiction workers, treatment providers 
and medical staff who were located together in shared premises. A drug court co-
ordinator – who was seconded from the Procurator Fiscal Service - facilitated the 
work of the drug court team.  
 
Glasgow Sheriff Court is the largest court of its level in Europe and it was not 
considered feasible for the drug court to deal with the anticipated volume of cases that 
might be referred to it. Instead, when initially established the drug court targeted 
accused persons who had been detained in police custody and who were prepared to 
tender a guilty plea to the offences with which they had been charged. This process 
was meant to ensure that offenders could be ‘fast tracked’ into treatment. The other 
Sheriffs in Glasgow retained the capacity to make DTTOs in respect of offenders who 
came into the court system through other routes. Two hundred and seventy-one cases 
were referred for a drug court assessment during the first two years of the Glasgow 
pilot, 150 of which resulted in a drug court order (McIvor et al., 2006). 
 
In Fife the drug court was presided over by one Sheriff (with backup) who sat in one 
court for two days per week and in a second court for one day per week. A designated 
Sheriff Clerk provided the appropriate administrative support. The drug court 
Supervision and Treatment team consisted of a team leader, social workers and 
assistants, addiction workers, medical officers, ten nurses and two project workers 
from a local drug and alcohol project. They were organised into three multi-
professional sub-teams which covered different geographical areas served by the drug 
court. There was no dedicated prosecutor and no drug court co-ordinator in Fife. 
 
All potential drug court cases in Fife were identified by Sheriffs presiding over other 
summary courts (sometimes brought to their attention by defence agents or, less 
usually, social workers). Offenders were referred across to the drug court at the 
sentencing stage if the adjudicating Sheriff thought that a drug court disposal might be 
appropriate. Sheriffs in Fife had agreed that from its inception only the drug court 
would impose DTTOs and all existing DTTOs were transferred in to the drug court 
when it became operational in September 2002. In the first two years of operation 872 
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referrals were made to the drug court, involving 382 offenders, 205 of which resulted 
in a drug court order being made (McIvor et al., 2006). 
 
The English Dedicated drug court pilots 
 
Dedicated drug courts (DDCs) were introduced in two pilot sites in England in 2005. 
As in Scotland, the DDC model was intended to provide a framework to facilitate 
partnership working between criminal justice and drug treatment agencies. The 
objectives of the pilots were to: reduce re-offending and drug use; introduce improved 
processes to support inter-agency working and a holistic approach to drug misuse; be 
cost neutral; and capable of replication (Martix Knowledge Group, 2008). 
 
The two sites chosen for the pilot were high crime areas characterised by high levels 
of acquisitive and potentially drug-related crime. The Leeds magistrates’ court DDC 
built upon an existing model that had been operating for a number of years, using a 
model that was almost identical to the proposed pilot. West London magistrates’ court 
was the second pilot site. Here the judiciary and court staff were enthusiastic about 
the drug court concept and had already begun working towards the creation of a drug 
court. 
 
As the evaluation of the pilot DDCs indicates (Matrix Knowledge Group, 2008), the 
underpinning framework consisted of a number of central elements: specialist court 
sessions (with the DDCs handling cases to completion or breach); continuity of 
sentencers across hearings; the provision of additional training for sentencers and 
other court staff; improved processes facilitate the flow of information between key 
parties; and an emphasis upon partnership characterised by multi-disciplinary work 
with other criminal justice agencies and professionals. 
 
The DDCs in each area were supported by professionals responsible for treatment and 
the supervision of court orders. The composition of the bench differed across the two 
sites, though in both the intention was to maximise sentencer continuity throughout an 
offender’s order. In Leeds, where 40 magistrates had volunteered to sit in the DDC, 
panels of four or five magistrates were formed from which panels of three magistrates 
were drawn for any one hearing. The intention was that at least one of the panel of 
three magistrates (and ideally more) would have sat on the panel when the offender 
previously appeared in court. The sentencers in West London comprised three District 
Judges (magistrates’ courts) and three benches of three magistrates each of whom 
presided over the drug court every six weeks (Matrix Knowledge Group, 2008).  
 
Offenders who were considered eligible for the drug courts were those deemed 
eligible for a Drug Rehabilitation Requirement (DRR) as part of a community order 
or suspended sentence order. In Leeds potentially eligible cases were referred to the 
DCC for a DRR assessment by a probation officer. In West London, a slightly more 
complex assessment process was initiated by the magistrates’ court, with cases only 
remitted to the DDC if, following an initial and full assessment, the offender was 
considered suitable for a DDR (Matrix Knowledge Group, 2008). It is worth noting 
that in the English pilots offenders were remanded in custody while assessments of 
suitability for the drug courts were carried out. In Scotland, by contrast, potential drug 
court participants were assessed in the community since this was believed to provide a 
more accurate assessment of their motivation to change. Any early concerns by 
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sentencers about the attendant risk of re-offending were soon offset by the perceived 
increase in the quality of the resulting assessments (Eley, Malloch et al., 2002; 
McIvor et al., 2006). 
 
Although the DDCs could, technically, make use of any available court disposal, 
those sentenced in the DCCs were made subject to community orders with drug 
rehabilitation requirements (DRRs). Under these orders offenders were required to 
attend treatment, undergo regular testing for drug use and attend court-based reviews. 
Little detail is provided by the process evaluation on the types of orders made (such as 
the use and nature of other requirements attached and the relative use of community 
orders and suspended sentence orders), though it was noted that the average sentence 
length was ten months and the average length of participation in the DDC was six 
months. The level and intensity of orders made was intended to be informed by the 
offence seriousness and by the offender’s history of drug use. Community orders most 
commonly consisted of supervision for a period of between nine and twelve months 
and a six month DRR (Matrix Knowledge Group, 2008). 
 
The number of orders made in the pilot courts, especially in West London, was 
reported to be lower than expected: 276 new cases per annum in Leeds and 60 in 
London. For this reason little quantitative data is presented in the process evaluation 
and that which is relates to Leeds. In this pilot site the average age of participants was 
30 years, 74 per cent were male and 87 per cent were white. They had an average of 
more than 14 previous convictions and 85 per cent reported heroin as their main drug 
of choice. (Matrix Knowledge Group, 2008). In terms of age, sex, criminal history 
and type of drug use, the profile of the Leeds DDC participants was very similar to 
those given drug court orders in Glasgow and Fife (McIvor et al., 2006). 
 
Key operational differences 
 
While drug courts across jurisdictions share a common aim of reducing drug use and 
drug-related crime, a distinctive feature of the drug court ‘movement’ has been the 
development of diverse procedures and practices. Even within a single jurisdiction, 
these are likely to vary across courts. For example, the nature and range of locally 
available drug treatment services will have a bearing on whether a single treatment 
provider or multiple treatment providers are engaged in providing services to drug 
court clients. In Scotland, the geographical location of the drug courts (one in the 
largest city and the other in a predominantly rural area) had important implications for 
potential capacity and throughput of cases which, in turn, was reflected in different 
routes of referral. However, even greater procedural differences can be found between 
the drug courts north and south of the border.  
 
A central feature of drug courts in the UK and in other jurisdictions is the role of the 
sentencer in overseeing progress of offenders. In the English pilots, offenders in 
Leeds were reviewed in court every four weeks while in West London, reviews took 
place every six weeks (Matrix Knowledge Group, 2008). By contrast, court based 
reviews of drug court orders in Scotland were usually conducted at least every month, 
and often fortnightly, especially in the early stages when frequent court reviews were 
considered necessary by sentencers and by supervision and treatment staff as a means 
of encouraging and sustaining offenders’ motivation to change. Although such a high 
frequency of reviews was not permissible under DTTO legislation, Sheriffs made 
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creative use of probation orders and deferred sentences to bring offenders back to 
court as often as was deemed to be required (McIvor et al., 2006).   
 
The review process in the English and Scottish pilot drug courts differed in other 
important ways. In particular, an important feature of the review process in the 
Scottish pilots (and in drug courts on other jurisdictions) was the pre-review meetings 
that were held in court each morning to discuss the progress of offenders who were 
appearing before the Sheriff for a review hearing in the afternoon. These meetings 
brought the Sheriff together with the key professionals involved in offenders’ 
supervision and treatment: criminal justice social workers, medical officers, nurses 
and addiction workers. Although convened in the courtroom, they were relatively 
informal in nature, being characterised by open sharing of information and discussion. 
In this regard, the Scottish drug court pilots – despite some resolved and some going 
inter-professional tensions – operated very much as a multi-disciplinary team 
convened by the Sheriff. Sheriffs valued highly the direct input from different 
professionals involved with a case and regarded these meetings as invaluable for 
providing ‘an overall picture’ of each participant and in so doing helping the sheriff to 
decide ‘which buttons to push’ in their subsequent dialogue with offenders in court 
(McIvor et al., 2006; McIvor, 2009).  
 
In the English pilots, however, court reviews were dependent upon written reports 
prepared by the supervising probation officer and presented to the magistrates or 
judge in court. These reports were compiled by the probation officer using 
information provided by the different professionals contributing to the supervision 
and treatment of offenders, but it appears that sentencers had little time to digest the 
content of reports and to respond to offenders accordingly, and that only the probation 
officer was present in court to speak to issues or concerns (Matrix Knowledge Group, 
2008). It seems that there was little – other than enhanced continuity of bench and, 
perhaps, the frequency of reviews - to differentiate the approach of the DDCs from 
the earlier DTTOs. Although multi-professional teamwork may have been good 
(despite some communication difficulties between different professional groups in the 
two sites) it is unlikely that the regular meetings of the multi-professional steering 
group would have been sufficient to engender the shared understanding, commitment 
and purpose that characterised the drug court pilots in Scotland (McIvor et al., 2006).  
 
The English and Scottish pilots also differed in terms of the options open to 
sentencers in the event of offenders’ non-compliance with the requirements of their 
orders. In the DDCs sentencers had a rather limited range of options available to 
sanction participants who were failing to comply: they could vary the requirements of 
orders upon an application for breach or revoke the order and re-sentence offenders 
for the original offence (Matrix Knowledge Group, 2008). In Scotland, sheriffs were 
reluctant to resort to revocation of a drug court order and endeavoured to retain 
offenders on orders if possible. They therefore welcomed the introduction, through 
the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003, of legislated intermediate sanctions to deal 
with non-compliance. 
  
OPERATIONAL AND PROCEDURAL CONCERNS  
 
Processes evaluations of drug courts in the UK and elsewhere have highlighted the 
importance of effective structures and processes to facilitate inter-agency working and 
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the promotion of a shared agenda with common goals (McIvor et al., 2006; Matrix 
Knowledge Group, 2008). For example one of the perceived strengths of the drug 
court in New South Wales was the multi-professional approach (Taplin, 2002). The 
scale of the challenge presented by the multi-disciplinary approach was highlighted 
by Wager (2002: 2) who observed that drug courts are “created from one of the most 
mismatched partnerships … a marriage between health and justice”. While some 
studies have identified philosophical and professional differences between treatment 
providers and the court, these generally appear to lessen over time (Taplin, 2002; 
McIvor et al., 2006). Research has also, however, highlighted a number of procedural 
issues that have the potential to undermine drug court effectiveness. 
 
Attrition 
 
High levels of attrition are common in drug courts as a result of non-compliance with 
testing and failure to appear for treatment and other appointments, linked to the 
vulnerability of drug court clients and the complexity of their problems. Studies of US 
drug courts generally report relatively high rates of retention and low rates of 
recidivism (Sanford and Arrigo, 2005) no doubt reflecting the drug and offending 
histories of participants (Freiberg, 2002b). By comparison, completion rates in the 
Canadian drug courts – which target more ‘serious’ offenders – were found to be low: 
14 per cent in Vancouver and 16 per cent in Toronto (Public Safety Canada (2007, 
2008). Attrition rates in Australian drug courts have also been high: for example, in 
New South Wales 42 per cent of drug court programmes had been terminated for non-
compliance (Briscoe and Coumarelos, 2000). Taplin (2002) identified a concern 
among some professionals that criteria for graduation were overly onerous, making it 
likely that few participants would graduate from the programme. Furthermore, 
Indermaur and Roberts (2003) have suggested that the range of demands placed upon 
participants in the South Queensland drug court may have resulted in participants 
being ‘set up to fail’. High levels of programme failure could have an overall net 
widening effect by drawing more offenders into the prison system for longer periods 
than would have been warranted by their original offence. 
 
Werb et al. (2007) have argued that the emphasis placed on abstinence and the limited 
tolerance of relapse in North America drug courts make it more likely that those with 
severe drug dependence will fail. In Scotland, where ‘high risk’ offenders were 
targeted, but where relapse was recognised by Sheriffs as likely and some allowance 
made accordingly, relatively high completion rates (47% and 30% in Glasgow and 
Fife respectively) were obtained (McIvor et al., 2006).  
 
Drug testing 
 
Random testing is a feature of drug courts. Testing usually occurs more frequently at 
the beginning of orders and decreases in frequency as participants make progress. 
Amendments to the frequency of testing can be made to reward progress or sanction 
non-compliance. A reduction in the number of tests may also be offset by an 
increased proportion of random tests. 
 
UK research into criminal justice drug interventions in which drug testing is a 
component have suggested that for some offenders regular drug testing can serve as a 
carrot or a stick, encouraging continued compliance or deterring further drug use (for 
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example, Turnbull et al., 2000; Eley, Gallop et al., 2002). However, drug testing of 
itself is unlikely to serve as an incentive to reduce drug use, particularly if testing is 
used primarily to monitor compliance rather than for therapeutic ends (McSweeney et 
al., 2008). Concerns have been expressed, for example, that drug testing fails to detect 
and reflect reductions in drug use thereby limiting its potential to accurately reflect 
progress made by offenders on their court orders (Eley, Gallop et al., 2002; 
McSweeney et al., 2008). 
 
Makkai (2002) identified a number of issues that arose in relation to drug testing in 
the Australian drug courts. These included concerns that drug testing was often not 
random and reluctance on the part of health workers to pass on negative test results to 
the court due to uncertainty about how sentencers might interpret and respond to this 
information. Access to supervised testing facilities has proved problematic in some 
jurisdictions due to the wide geographical areas covered by the drug court. 
 
Dealing with diversity  
 
The ability of drug courts to deal effectively with diverse populations has also arisen 
as a concern. In the USA this provided the impetus for the creation of drug courts 
aimed at specific populations, with the first female drug court being established in 
1992 in Kalamazoo, Michigan and tribal drug courts subsequently being introduced to 
deal with indigenous offenders (Huddleston et al., 2008). In other jurisdictions the 
ability of drug courts to engage effectively with female and indigenous or offenders 
from minority ethnic groups has been questioned. For example, professionals in 
Scotland expressed concern at the absence of treatment and other services that were 
suited to female offenders and sentencers identified compliance as a particular 
problem for women (McIvor et al., 2006). In New South Wales, the perceived lack of 
suitable treatment options for female drug court participants was considered to be a 
barrier to participation and the percentage of women entering the drug court would 
have been higher if it reflected the real level of need. For example, few residential 
rehabilitation facilities were said to be willing to accept women with their children at 
short notice and the high level of commitment required by the drug court regime may 
have disadvantaged those with parenting commitments who found it more difficult to 
comply (Taplin, 2002). 
Internationally, evidence regarding completion rates and outcomes for women is 
somewhat mixed, with some studies suggesting lower retention rates for women (for 
example, McIvor et al, 2006) and others indicating higher rates of drug court 
programme completion (for example, Dannerbeck et al., 2002). A qualitative study of 
female drug court participants in Northern California suggested that women 
welcomed the support, concern and understanding offered by sentencers and drug 
court staff and valued individualised treatment, services that accepted children, female 
counsellors (given their previous experiences of trauma and abuse) and the 
opportunity to participate in work or education (Fischer et al., 2007). 
With respect to ethnicity, Taplin (2002) suggests that the number of aboriginal clients 
accepted onto the drug court in New South Wales programme was low because most 
had previous convictions for alcohol-related violence, and violence offenders were 
explicitly excluded from the drug court. In addition, some South-east Asian offenders 
who might otherwise have been eligible were excluded because they or their parents 
could not speak English. The Perth drug court was also found not to have engaged 
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with many indigenous offenders because the drug court model – with its onerous 
requirements – was not well suited to them and because of the absence of appropriate 
community-based treatment facilities for this group of offenders (Crime Research 
Centre, 2003). 
Other practical and procedural issues 
 
In some jurisdictions resource constraints have made it difficult for treatment agencies 
to incorporate ‘high demand’ clients. The resource intensive nature of drug courts is 
often underestimated, resulting in under-staffing (Eley, Malloch et al., 2002). As 
Makkai (2002) has observed, caseloads that might be considered ‘normal’ for other 
court disposals (such as probation) may need to be adjusted down to accommodate the 
needs of drug court participants. Equally, it is becoming clear that there needs to be 
sufficient follow-up support for participants once they have ‘graduated’ from a drug 
court programme, highlighting the importance of services and supports aimed at 
enhancing participants’ social inclusion and integration (Taplin, 2002; McIvor et al., 
2006).  
 
The identification of culturally appropriate sanctions and rewards has also proved 
challenging for drug courts outside the USA. The applauding in court of participants’ 
achievements is a feature of most of the drug courts in Australia but would not be 
regarded as fitting easily with the court culture in the UK. Observation of courts in 
which magistrates and others reward participants with a round of applause 
corroborates that this can constitute a powerful source of positive reinforcement for 
participants, confirming their sense of achievement and boosting their self esteem. 
Beyond this, however, rewards most commonly take the form of progress from one 
stage of a programme to another or (as in Scotland) the varying of specific drug court 
requirements. As Lawrence and Freeman (2002, p.74) observed, ‘the NSW Drug 
Court Team were not comfortable with replicating the razzmatazz of buttons, t-shirts, 
hugs, cheering and tears, which is evident in some US drug courts’.  
 
In the Scottish pilots there was a broad consensus among relevant professionals 
regarding the eligibility criteria for the drug courts, though some believed that 
younger offenders should have the opportunity to be given orders. It was agreed that a 
pattern of relatively minor but persistent offending linked to drug use would signal 
potential suitability for orders, but reservations were expressed regarding the 
appropriateness of the drug court for offenders with co-existing mental health 
problems or convictions for violence (Eley, Malloch et al., 2002; McIvor et al, 2006). 
Elsewhere, professionals have also expressed concern about the incidence of mental 
health problems among drug courts participants and their implications for offender 
management and about the lack of clarity regarding the definition of ‘violent conduct’ 
with respect to eligibility for a drug court order and the potential consequences for 
staff and public safety (Taplin, 2002). 
 
A further challenge for the Scottish drug court pilots was the increasing incidence of 
cocaine use (especially in Glasgow) and lack of existing treatment resources. It was 
envisaged by professionals that a wider range of resources, including residential 
rehabilitation, would be required and recognised that this would have important 
resource implications (McIvor et al., 2006). Similar issues have arisen with respect to 
methamphetamine and cocaine use in Australia (Weatherburn et al., 2001) and the 
USA (Huddleston et al., 2008).  
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Finally, as Freiberg (2002) and Nolan (2001) have commented, concerns have been 
expressed that drug court models place too much power in the hands of individual 
judges with the result that they may become less legal and more personalised. This 
may result in inconsistencies between sentencers and, where there is little or no limit 
on court intervention, sanctions may be overly onerous and the length of order 
imposed disproportionate to the offence. Freiberg (2002) has further cautioned that 
that drug courts may compromise the adversarial system and undermine the role of 
the prosecution and defence by rendering them too ambiguous. However, the relative 
informality and absence of an adversarial approach appear to be important elements of 
the drug court process. The challenge, it seems, lies in ensuring that sufficient checks 
and balances are in place to foster a problem-solving orientation while at the same 
time safeguarding the interests and rights of the offenders concerned.  
 
ARE DRUG COURTS EFFECTIVE?  
 
It is still too early to say whether and to what extent drug courts in the UK will have a 
measurable impact upon drug use and drug-related offending though initial findings 
are encouraging. In the Scottish pilots there was a steady decline in the proportions of 
participants testing positive drug for opiates and benzodiazepines over the course of  
drug court orders and most offenders reported marked reductions in drug use and 
drug-related crime. Fifty per cent of offenders were reconvicted within 12 months and 
71% within two years, though the reconviction rate was lower among completers than 
(67% after 24 months) than among those whose orders had been breached (76%). 
There was a significant reduction in the frequency of convictions among those who 
successfully completed a drug court order (McIvor et al., 2006).  
  
A robust quantitative analysis of the impact of the English pilot DDCs has not yet 
been possible. However, interviews with offenders in the Leeds and West London 
DDCs revealed confidence among them that participation in the DDC could reduce 
their drug use and impact positively upon their lives over time, with the 
encouragement shown by those involved in the operation of the drug court being a 
significant factor in this respect. If levels of motivation were not particularly high 
when offenders entered the drug court, they appeared to increase over time: offenders 
in Leeds reported that their compliance with treatment and review increased as their 
order progressed (Matrix Knowledge Group, 2008).  
 
Despite frequent methodological limitations, local and national evaluations of drug 
courts in the USA have been generally encouraging. There is accumulating evidence 
that participation in drug courts can contribute to reductions in drug use and drug-
related offending and improvements in health and well-being (for example, Freeman, 
2002; Gebelein, 2000; Goldkamp et al., 2001; Lind et al., 2002; Makkai and Veraar, 
2003; Wilson et al., 2006). For example, Belenko (1998, 2001) concluded that drug 
courts achieved better completion rates than traditional courts and brought about 
reductions in drug use and recidivism while offenders were participating in the 
programme. Latimer et al.’s (2006) meta-analysis suggests that, if anything, the 
benefits of drug court may actually increase over time.  
 
Recent meta-analyses3 have suggested that drug courts are associated with clear and 
significant reductions in recidivism (for example, Lowenkamp et al., 2005; Latimer et 
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al., 2006; Shaffer, 2006; Wilson et al., 2006). Latimer et al. (2006) estimated that drug 
treatment courts reduced the recidivism rate of participants by 14 per cent compared 
with offenders in control or comparison groups. Similarly, Wilson et al. (2006) 
concluded that the reduction in offending attributable to drug court participation (in 
comparison to ‘traditional’ processing) was 26 per cent across all studies and 14 per 
cent for the two studies that employed randomised controls. 
 
According to Sanford and Arrigo (2005) recidivism rates for drug court graduates are 
usually lower than for non-graduates and those for drop-outs are usually higher than 
for comparison cases. Roman et al.’s (2003) survey of 2,020 graduates from 95 drug 
courts identified re-arrest rates of 16.4 per cent and 27.5 per cent respectively after 12 
and 24 months. They also found, however, that re-arrest rates varied across courts and 
appeared to be related to the targeted population: for example, courts with higher re-
arrest rates tended to accept offenders who were cocaine and heroin users and who 
were classified by drug court staff as having moderate or severe drug problems. 
 
Generally encouraging results have also been reported from evaluations of drug courts 
in Australia (Makkai and Veraar, 2003; Payne, 2008; Wundersitz, 2007; but see 
Crime Justice Centre, 2003 for a less positive conclusion). For example in New South 
Wales there were lower levels of recidivism among ‘successful’ drug court 
participants than among those whose programmes were terminated and among 
randomised controls. Non-terminated participants remained offence-free for longer 
and had fewer new offences involving shoplifting, other theft, house breaking and 
possession of drugs (Lind et al., 2002). Spending on illicit drugs reduced significantly 
when offenders participated in the programme, with this lower rate of spending 
maintained at eight and twelve months. Significant improvements were also found in 
participants’ health and social functioning as assessed by standardised questionnaires 
(Freeman, 2002). However these benefits were somewhat offset by the high rate of 
attrition, leading Freeman (2002) to recommend that the court should target offenders 
who were facing lengthy prison sentences and who would therefore be more likely to 
comply with the programme. 
 
Identifying effective features of drug courts 
 
Given the multi-faceted nature of drug court programmes, there is growing interest in 
which features of drug courts are associated with success. For instance, Wilson et al 
(2006) have argued that there is a need for more rigorous evaluations and a clearer 
focus upon the ‘black box’ of drug treatment courts (Goldkamp, 2004). While a 
review of drug court evaluations by the US Government Accountability Office (2005) 
was unable to find evidence that any specific drug court components (such as the 
behaviour of the judge or the amount of treatment received) were associated with 
reduced recidivism, other analyses have identified particular aspects of the drug court 
approach that appear to be instrumental in bringing about change. These include 
effective participant screening (Sanford and Arrigo, 2005), the use of graduated 
sanctions (Goldkamp et al, 2001; Goldkamp, 2004; Sanford and Arrigo, 2005); 
programme duration (Latimer et al. (2006); the creation of a multi-professional team 
that interacts with the judge to inform decision-making (Olson et al., 2001); and the 
use of a single treatment provider (Wilson et al., 2006). Sanford and Arrigo (2005) 
highlight the need for further research on the role of treatment in drug courts. While 
researchers agree that this is likely to be a key component (Goldkamp, 2004), there 
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has been little research into its significance in relation to other elements of the drug 
court programme (Banks and Gottfredson, 2003; Wilson et al., 2006). 
 
Makkai (2002) has suggested that the most significant change brought about by drug 
courts has been the linking of treatment directly with the judge whereby ‘the notion of 
an impartial arbitrator is replaced with a caring, but authoritarian, guardian’ (Payne, 
2005, p.74). Evidence that sentencers may have a key role to play in determining drug 
court outcomes is provided by a long-term study of a drug court in Oregon. 
Recidivism rates differed widely among judges, with reductions of recidivism varying 
from 4 per cent to 42 per cent (Finigan et al., 2007). Although Sanford and Arrigo 
(2005) found no consistent evidence that the frequency of judicial reviews was 
associated with improved drug court outcomes, Marlowe et al. (2004; 2005) found 
that the more frequent reviews resulted in improved outcomes for higher risk 
offenders. 
 
Consistency of sentencers appears, however, to be linked to drug court success. For 
example, Goldkamp (2004) found that higher levels of contact with the same judge 
resulted in lower levels of recidivism while the process evaluation of the DDCs in 
England found that continuity of sentencer across court appearances was associated 
with enhanced compliance with court hearings, lower levels of positive drug tests for 
heroin, an increased rate of completion of orders and a reduced frequency of 
reconviction (Matrix Knowledge Group, 2008). A review of specialist courts in 
different jurisdictions commissioned by the then Department of Constitutional Affairs 
concluded that judicial monitoring offenders to be related to their success (Plotnikoff 
and Woolfson, 2005). 
 
Wexler (2001) has suggested that judicial involvement in specialist courts can 
promote rehabilitation by contributing to the ‘desistance narratives’ (Maruna, 2001) 
that help to facilitate and sustain desistance from crime. McIvor (2009) has argued 
that the exchanges that take place between sentencers and offenders in drug court can 
enhance procedural justice4 (Tyler, 1990) which confers greater legitimacy upon 
judges and increases the responsiveness of participants to exhortations that they 
should change. Support for such an argument can be found in Gottfredson et al.’s 
(2007) finding that judicial review directly reduced drug use and indirectly reduced 
criminal behaviour by increasing participants’ perceptions of procedural fairness.  
 
Differences in effectiveness across different groups 
 
There is also some evidence that drug courts may be differentially effective with 
different groups of offenders. The low number of women on drug court orders in the 
UK pilots has thus far precluded a gendered analysis of outcomes. However, Roman 
et al. (2003) found that female drug court graduates did better, in terms of subsequent 
re-arrest, than male graduates. In a study of the Brooklyn Treatment Court in New 
York (Harrell et al., 2001) women who participated in the drug court programme were 
found to have lower levels of self-reported drug use and recidivism than women in a 
comparison group who were eligible for the drug court but who lived outside its 
catchment area. No other benefits in terms of financial status and health were, 
however, observed.  
 
 15 
Roman et al (2003) found that re-arrest rates among drug court graduates were lowest 
among white, highest among black and intermediate among Hispanic offenders. These 
differences in recidivism by ethnicity appear to be closely linked to the types of drugs 
favoured by different groups and associated differences in drug-related offending. 
Overall, there is some tentative evidence that drug courts do better with more drug 
dependent offenders with longer criminal histories (for example, Marlowe at al., 
2006). This would be consistent with the finding that younger offenders appear not to 
benefit from drug court involvement (Eardley, et al., 2004; Latimer et al., 2006) and 
would echo the views of practitioners in Scotland that younger offenders (i.e. those 
under 21 years of age) were unlikely to be sufficiently motivated to meet the rigorous 
demands of a drug court regime (McIvor et al., 2006).  
 
Cost effectiveness 
 
Given that a central feature of drug courts is their high levels of supervision, treatment 
and support (including regular court-based reviews) it is not surprising that they are 
resource intensive compared to other community sanctions. The process evaluation of 
in Leeds estimated that DDC DRRs were associated with additional costs of £4,633 
for a 12 month order and £6,792 for a 24 month order compared to non DCC DRRs 
(Matrix Knowledge Group, 2008). In Scotland, the cost of a drug court order across 
the two pilot sites was, on average, £4,401 more than a non-drug court DTTO, though 
this unit cost difference could have been reduced through an increase in the number of 
referrals in Glasgow and the introduction of a more efficient assessment process in 
Fife (McIvor et al., 2006). The costs of drug court orders (£18,486 in Scotland based 
on data for 2001-4) also need to be set alongside the cost of alternative sentences and 
the cost savings from possible reductions in drug use and crime. The Scottish Prison 
Service estimated that in 2003-4 the cost of six months in prison was £15,336 while 
12 months in prison cost £30,672 (Scottish Executive, 2005). It was also found that 
self-reported expenditure on drugs among drug court participants in Scotland reduced, 
on average, by £402 per week resulting, it was estimated, in reductions in property 
crime to the value of approximately £1,200 per participant per week (McIvor et al., 
2006). 
 
A break-even analysis of the Leeds DDC suggested that between 8 per cent and 14 
per cent of participating offenders would need to stop taking drugs for five years from 
completion of the sentence for DDCs to provide a net economic benefit to society 
(Matrix Knowledge Group, 2008). Recidivism data are not yet available for the 
English DDC pilots, however, as we have seen, the Scottish evaluation found that 29 
per cent of drug court participants remained free of further convictions in the two year 
period after drug court orders was imposed. Although it is likely that the rate of 
reconviction will increase in subsequent years, it is also well-established that most 
offenders who are going to be reconvicted following a community sentence or 
imprisonment will be reconvicted within two years. That being so (and assuming that 
the reconviction rates achieved in Scotland are also achieved by the English pilots) it 
can be assumed that drug courts in the UK are likely to prove at least cost neutral and 
probably cost beneficial in the longer term. 
 
There is also international evidence to suggest that drug courts may be cost effective: 
although they are more expensive than traditional court processing, when the costs of 
alternative sentences are taken into account the benefits of US drug courts have often 
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been assessed to outweigh the costs (for example, Belenko, 2001; Finigan, 1999). In 
Australia the economic evaluation of the New South Wales drug court suggested that 
it was cost-effective in comparison with the sentences that it replaced. Although the 
cost per day for an individual placed on a drug court programme was slightly higher 
than the per diem cost for the control group, it was estimated to cost more to avert 
further shoplifting and drug possession offences using alternative sanctions (Lind et 
al., 2002). 
 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
Although drug courts are a relatively new phenomenon in the UK they are now well 
established in other jurisdictions and the international evidence in support of drug 
courts’ effectiveness, in terms of their ability to bring about reductions in offending, is 
increasingly persuasive. The findings from meta-analyses and narrative reviews of 
drug court evaluations generally support the conclusion that drug courts can be 
effective in reducing drug use and drug-related crime. Attention is now turning to the 
identification of aspects of the drug court model that appear critical to its success.  
 
However the wide range of contexts in which drug courts have been introduced and 
the wide variations in who they target and how they operate mean that detailed and 
rigorous local evaluations are necessary to determine whether and how, in a particular 
jurisdiction, drug courts are a viable and effective means of supporting offenders in 
drug treatment and breaking the link between drug use and crime. Changes from 
outside the drug court can have a strong effect upon drug court operation and 
effectiveness (Sanford and Arrigo, 2005). Often, however, decisions about drug court 
expansion appear to have been made in the absence of a sufficiently solid empirical 
base (Werb et al, 2007).  
 
In the UK, while the initial results of process and outcome evaluations are broadly 
encouraging, rigorous analyses of recidivism, drug use and costs with large enough 
samples of offenders over a sufficient follow-up period are still required to determine 
the added economic and social value that drug courts can provide. It is envisaged, 
however, that the resource intensiveness and high unit costs associated with drug 
courts will mean that they are only viable in high crime areas where a throughput of 
cases can be guaranteed, where there is commitment and enthusiasm among 
sentencers and where there is existing capacity to provide the treatment and other 
services that are necessary to support those whose offending is related to their misuse 
of drugs. 
 
Even if they are unlikely for pragmatic reasons to constitute a universal response to 
drug-related offending, the wider impact of drug courts on criminal justice processes 
needs to be acknowledged. An important impact of the drug court ‘movement’ in the 
USA, UK and elsewhere has been the impetus that drug courts have provided to the 
development of other forms of specialist, problem-solving courts. These include 
domestic abuse courts, mental health courts, disability courts (for offenders with 
learning difficulties or ‘cognitive disabilities’)  and community courts (which adopt a 
community-focused problem-solving approach to local crime) . As Goldkamp (2003, 
p.203) has argued, through ‘method and substance, its philosophy and values’ and 
through its transformation to a more generalised problem solving-approach, the drug 
court model has served in various jurisdictions as a major catalyst for judicial change.  
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1
 Juvenile drug courts were introduced in the United States 1990. Compared to adult drug courts, they 
involve the co-operation of a wider range of community agencies (for example, child protection, 
education etc.) and require the development of a more collaborative relationship between the court and 
the offender’s family. Sanford and Arrigo (2005) suggest that juvenile drug courts face additional 
challenges posed by young people’s indifferent attitudes towards drug treatment programmes, the 
influence of gang membership or delinquent peers and young people’s lack of maturity.  
2
 In England and Wales (but not Scotland) DTTOs have been replaced by community orders with drug 
rehabilitation requirements. 
3
 A meta-analysis is a statistical technique for combining the results from a number of separate studies 
to assess the size of effect produced by an intervention. 
4
 Procedural justice refers to the fairness and transparency with which legal proceedings are conducted 
(see Tyler, 1990). 
